Problem of Evil

The Problem of Evil is the oldest and most persistent argument against theism. In its most general form: if God is omnipotent, God can prevent evil; if God is wholly good, God would prevent evil; evil exists; therefore an omnipotent and wholly good God does not.

The modern literature distinguishes two versions. The Logical Problem of Evil, given canonical form by J. L. Mackie in 1955, argues that the classical theistic propositions are jointly inconsistent. The Evidential Problem of Evil, developed most influentially by William Rowe, grants logical consistency but argues that the existence of certain kinds of evil, particularly intense suffering with no detectable greater good, is evidence against theism even granting the Free Will Defense.

The most influential theistic responses are Alvin Plantinga‘s Free Will Defense against the logical version, and Skeptical Theism against the evidential version. The latter argues that we should not expect to be able to detect the goods that justify divine permission of evil, given the cognitive distance between us and an omniscient God. Whether skeptical theism succeeds, or whether it overgeneralizes into a more thoroughgoing skepticism, is itself a substantial debate.

The historical bridge between the medieval and modern treatments runs through Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz‘s Theodicy, which gave the problem its modern name and introduced the apparatus of possible worlds that contemporary discussions still use.